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Following the parliamentary elections in Georgia on October 29, 2024, the ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), achieved a remarkable 53.93% of the popular vote, thereby securing a parliamentary majority and a mandate to govern exclusively. These elections were significant, as they marked Georgia’s first experience with a fully proportional voting system. However, allegations of electoral irregularities led the four opposition parties that surpassed the electoral threshold to contest the results and subsequently boycott the new parliament.

Once considered a democratic leader in the Caucasus and a model reformist within the associated trio of the EU, Georgia now faces a climate of increasing political polarization and crisis. The country’s EU membership prospects have stalled, and the legitimacy of its parliamentary elections has come under scrutiny due to reported irregularities. This scenario raises questions about whether Georgian Dream’s remarkable electoral success, achieved after it had already been in power for 12 years, results from electoral manipulation or is instead a product of the party’s contentious political strategies and campaign tactics in recent years.

Georgian Dream or Ivanishvili’s Vision?

Founded in 2012 by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who had lost his Georgian citizenship amid political tensions with then-president Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian Dream party was created to counter the increasingly authoritarian and kleptocratic rule of the United National Movement (UNM), which had begun using repressive tactics against opposition groups. The GD coalition, encompassing a broad spectrum of political ideologies, succeeded in winning the 2012 parliamentary elections, thereby gaining control of the government.

Ivanishvili, often viewed as an oligarch due to the wealth he amassed in Russia, held the position of prime minister for roughly one year before passing the role to Irakli Garibashvili. He then stepped down as Georgian Dream’s leader and announced his departure from active politics. In 2018, however, Ivanishvili re-engaged in political affairs, resuming his role as chairman of GD. Although he announced his retirement in 2021, he returned again in 2023 as the honorary chairman of the party. Throughout this period, Georgian Dream has retained unilateral control, winning both the 2016 and 2020 parliamentary elections.

Despite the continuity of GD’s rule, Georgia has witnessed considerable turnover in its executive leadership, with eight different prime ministers holding office over the past 12 years. While Ivanishvili has repeatedly announced his retirement from politics, it is widely believed that he continues to wield significant influence over the government through informal means, with many of his close associates holding key positions within both the party and the administration.

Power Consolidation within the Dream

Particularly since 2019, Georgian Dream governments have exhibited an increasingly stringent approach toward opposition groups. In 2019, the Georgian government responded forcefully to opposition-led protests in Tbilisi, sparked after Russian MP Sergei Gavrilov delivered a speech in the Georgian parliament. During this period, the parliamentary immunity of prominent opposition MP Nika Melia was revoked. Following Melia’s election as the leader of the UNM and his failure to post bail during an ongoing trial, an arrest warrant was issued against him. Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia subsequently resigned over the arrest warrant issue, and Irakli Gharibashvili, who had previously held the role from 2013 to 2015, was appointed as his successor.

Moreover, Prime Minister Gharibashvili’s second term represents a pivotal period for Georgia, characterized by a shift to more autonomous and economic sovereigntist policies (visible in its critical stance toward both the U.S. and the EU and its overtures to Russia and China) plus intensified pressure on opposition groups. This era is particularly notable for escalating tensions between the government and President Salome Zourabichvili, who had initially been elected in 2018 with the backing of Georgian Dream and Bidzina Ivanishvili.

This was a pivotal period for Georgia, characterized by a shift to more autonomous and economic sovereigntist policies plus intensified pressure on opposition groups.

The much talked about “foreign agents law” mandates that media organizations and NGOs that receive over 20% of their funding from foreign sources must register as foreign agents or incur a fine of 25,000 GEL. After being withdrawn in 2023, following widespread protests and pressure, the bill was reintroduced to the parliamentary agenda in April 2024. This time, it passed, despite strong opposition from both the opposition parties and President Salome Zourabichvili, plus widespread protests.

Against this backdrop, the 2024 parliamentary elections mark a significant juncture in Georgia’s political trajectory. Notably, these elections were the first conducted under a fully proportional representation system. In previous elections, Georgian Dream had secured a dominant position by winning nearly all single-constituency seats—71 in the 2016 election and 30 in 2020 following electoral reforms. This shift to a proportional system in 2024 represented a crucial opportunity for the opposition, which had been unable to secure single-constituency seats in the two prior elections, to influence parliamentary composition more effectively.

A Campaign Driven by Conspiracy Theories and Ambitious Aspirations

The pre-election climate was not entirely favorable for Georgian Dream. Notably, the U.S. imposed two waves of sanctions on individuals involved in enacting the Foreign Agents Law and the violent suppression of protests. Additionally, the suspension of economic aid to the Georgian government, the cancellation of bilateral military exercises, and the drafting of legislative measures concerning Georgia in the U.S. Congress created significant challenges for Georgian Dream’s domestic image in the lead-up to the elections. Contrary to expectations, the EU opted not to pursue substantial formal sanctions against Georgia. Instead, it issued statements indicating that membership negotiations would not commence and economic aid would be withheld should the Georgian government fail to alter its current course.

Georgian Dream crafted a campaign strategy aimed at resonating with conservative voters and staunchly dichotomizing peace and war.

In the lead-up to the 2024 election, Georgian Dream crafted a campaign strategy aimed at resonating with conservative voters and staunchly dichotomizing peace and war. Throughout the campaign, pro-Western opposition leaders were portrayed as foreign agents and alleged proxies of the so-called “Global War Party,” accused of threatening Georgia’s traditional values and risking a war with Russia. The party’s political leaders propagated a narrative that, under the direction of the Global War Party, the opposition would create a “second front” against Russia, plunging Georgia into war and turmoil. This message was reinforced by prominent billboards across the country, which starkly contrasted Georgia’s stability with the destruction seen in Ukraine. Georgian Dream accused the opposition of instigating the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and suggested that opposition parties could face a ban if they secured an electoral victory with a constitutional majority.

Georgian Dream and Bidzina Ivanishvili also strategically emphasized the issue of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Speaking in Gori, Ivanishvili stated that, should the party secure a constitutional majority, it would hold those accountable for the 2008 war responsible, issue an apology to the people of South Ossetia, and restore Georgia’s territorial integrity. These statements have fueled speculation within Georgia that a Georgian Dream electoral victory could potentially pave the way for establishing a federation that includes Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with backing from Russia.

Georgian Dream’s electoral promises extended beyond matters of territorial integrity; the party also pledged that, with a constitutional majority, it would amend the constitution to recognize Orthodox Christianity as a core element of Georgia’s national identity. Given the Georgian Orthodox Church’s historical significance in shaping national identity and its standing as the most trusted institution in public opinion surveys, this approach can be seen as a strategically effective electoral move. Moreover, ahead of the elections Georgian Dream also enacted legislation prohibiting LGBT-related advocacy and public gatherings, asserting that Georgia would uphold traditional family values and protect its cultural heritage.

Georgian Dream also leveraged exceptional economic growth figures, bolstered by the influx of capital fleeing to Georgia in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war, to project that the nation’s per capita income could surpass that of several European countries by the 2030s. This narrative underscored the narrative of GD, as put forward by its officials, of advancing toward European standards with dignity, positioning the country as increasingly economically self-sufficient and no longer reliant on Western economic aid.

Opposition: Fragmented and Inconsistent Under the Watch of Georgian Dream

Ahead of the 2024 parliamentary elections, the opposition faced significant challenges stemming from Georgian Dream’s 12-year rule. The election environment was marked by judicial decisions that were widely regarded as politically motivated, increasingly targeting opposition leaders, as well as independent journalists and researchers. Lacking the economic, political, and media resources of the ruling party, the opposition structured its campaign around a vision of returning Georgia to its European trajectory and steering it away from a Russian-style autocratic model. The United National Movement (UNM) strategically distanced itself from Saakashvili who was seen as a deal breaker by other opposition parties and sought alliances with other opposition groups.

Lacking the ruling party’s resources, the opposition structured its campaign around a vision of returning Georgia to its European trajectory and steering it away from a Russian-style autocratic model.

In this context, President Salome Zourabichvili—whose conflicts with the Georgian Dream have intensified, including an attempt by the ruling party to remove her from office—took a substantial political risk by founding the “Georgian Charter.” This initiative aimed to unite pro-European opposition forces around a shared agenda. However, despite her efforts, negotiations among various opposition parties ultimately faltered, leading them to contest the election as four separate blocs. Salome Zourabichvili stated that if the election results enabled the formation of a coalition, she intended to establish a technical government focused on returning Georgia to its EU-aligned trajectory. She also indicated that she had selected a candidate to propose for the role of prime minister, whose identity she planned to reveal following the elections.

The post-election decision by the Georgian Dream to postpone the opening of EU accession negotiations until 2028 threw a lifeline to the opposition and provoked widespread public backlash. President Salome Zourabichvili joined the demonstrations and declared that an illegitimate parliament lacked the authority to elect a new president, asserting her intention to remain in office beyond the expiration of her term in December.

The post-election decision by the Georgian Dream to postpone the opening of EU accession negotiations until 2028, under the pretext of avoiding external blackmail, threw a lifeline to the opposition and provoked widespread public backlash. This move revitalized opposition-led street protests, which had been diminishing following the elections. President Salome Zourabichvili joined the demonstrations, during which law enforcement authorities employed excessive force against protesters. She declared that an illegitimate parliament lacked the authority to elect a new president, asserting her intention to remain in office beyond the expiration of her term in December. Furthermore, she called for civil disobedience, aligning with four pro-Western opposition parties to advocate for re-elections.

Election Results: Transparent Voting and Electronic Tallying?

The opposition suffered a substantial defeat in rural regions, highlighting the inadequacy of its campaign strategies and organizational efforts there.

While the opposition front performed well in Tbilisi, urban centers, and the diaspora, it suffered a substantial defeat in rural regions, highlighting the inadequacy of its campaign strategies and organizational efforts there. The opposition and the President attributed this outcome in part to electoral manipulation including vote buying and intimidation, claiming the results were rigged. The four opposition blocs also declared that they would refuse their parliamentary mandates and two of them—UNM and Coalition 4 Change—have already applied to the Central Election Committee for the cancellation of their parliamentary lists. CEC on the other hand, denied allegations of rigging and shut the door on cancellation of parliamentary lists.

Moreover, a notable feature of this election was the debut of electronic voting machines, with nearly 90% of voters casting their ballots electronically. This new system raised concerns about vote confidentiality, particularly due to the thin A4 paper used for ballots, which the opposition argued could have compromised voter secrecy by revealing choices. A judge initially annulled results in 30 precincts following these complaints; however, after a protracted 22-hour session, the Supreme Court of Appeals overturned this ruling, preventing a precedent. Given that over 650,000 people in Georgia receive social assistance and a significant chunk of the employed are public servants, maintaining the secrecy of voters is particularly crucial.

The Ball Is Now in Georgian Dream’s Court

President Salome Zourabichvili advocated for the current government and parliament to remain in office, citing the ongoing national crisis, and proposed that early elections be scheduled for 2025. However, Georgian Dream convened the new parliament in November without opposition MPs and declared that the country will hold presidential elections on December 14 to replace Zourabichvili, whose term is set to conclude. The forthcoming presidential election will be decided by an electoral college comprising 150 parliamentary members and 150 representatives from autonomous regions and municipalities. Given the structure of this electoral college, Georgian Dream’s ex-footballer candidate (who was a part of an anti-Western parliamentary group) has a strong likelihood of success. In light of President Zourabichvili’s declaration that she will not vacate her office at the end of her term, it can be argued that Georgia, already grappling with a political crisis, is on the brink of entering a new phase of instability.

In light of President Zourabichvili’s declaration that she will not vacate her office at the end of her term, it can be argued that Georgia, already grappling with a political crisis, is on the brink of entering a new phase of instability.

In this context, the course of action taken by the new Georgian Dream government will hold significant importance for Georgia’s political future. Party officials have expressed their intention to pursue a reset in relations with both the European Union and the United States. Furthermore, in a pre-election interview, Ivanishvili stated that he would meet with the American ambassador after the elections and hoped that the issue involving Credit Suisse, in which his funds were allegedly misappropriated through a scheme, would be resolved. However, the question of whether Western powers will ultimately opt to engage constructively with Georgian Dream remains unresolved. Currently, Georgia’s EU accession process is effectively frozen, with the European Union urging the GD government to change course. Nevertheless, developments over the past year suggest that the opening of accession negotiations has not been prioritized by Georgian Dream authorities. Equally significant is how relations with Russia will be managed, particularly given that the Georgian Dream’s electoral promises concerning territorial integrity would necessitate extensive consultations with Russian authorities.


Orçun Çalışkan is a PhD candidate at the Institute for European Studies at Tbilisi State University. He has an MA in Eurasia and Caucasus Studies from Tbilisi State University and holds a scholarship from the Ministry of National Education of Türkiye in the field of Georgia Studies, under its YLSY program. His research focuses on the influence of the EU in Georgian politics.

Image made by John Chrobak using “President Zourabichvili Giving Speech in Rustaveli Hall,” by Giorgi Abdaladze licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International; “2024 Georgian Protests, April 28 (4),” by Jelger Groeneveld licensed under CC Attribution 2.0 Generic; “Solvita Āboltiņa tiekas ar Gruzijas premjerministru,” by Saeima licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic; “Irakli Kobakhidze and Volodymyr Groysman 01,” by Власність Секретаріату Кабінету Міністрів України licensed under CC Attribution 4.0 International; “Tbilisi Pro-Europe March (20 Oct. 2024),” by Giorgi Chokheli licensed under CC CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication; “Georgia election map 2024,” by Furfur licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International.