For advocates of political liberalism in the European Union and elsewhere, the early parliamentary elections held in Germany on February 23, 2025 produced relatively good news: despite doubling its share of the electorate compared to the previous elections in 2021 and scoring nearly 21% of the votes, the far-right “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) ended up second, behind the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). That the (likely) future chancellor Friedrich Merz, leader of the CDU, who is a strong supporter of EU-integration and of further military assistance to Ukraine, promised never to govern and form a coalition with the AfD was also certainly met with relief in Kyiv, Brussels and elsewhere.
“Normalization” of German Politics or Turning Point?
At first sight, these electoral results could be seen as a form of normalization of German politics, insofar as they bring the country’s politics into alignment with broader European trends. They might therefore appear as the end of a German exception in EU-Europe.
Indeed, while the far right has always remained marginal in postwar (West-)Germany, failing until 2017 to reach the 5% hurdle necessary to enter parliament, it has long been an electorally powerful force—and, in some cases, even a governing party—in a number of other EU countries. Notably in France, where the first breakthrough of the far right at presidential elections happened in 2002, but also in Austria, Italy and the Netherlands, where the far right has been or is governing as part of government coalitions.
By the same token, the misfortunes of the so-called “traffic light coalition”—comprised of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens, which governed Germany from December 2021 until December 2024 and whose breakdown prompted the German President to call for early elections in February 2025—bear some resemblance to those of other “centrist” Western executives that tried to initiate a shift in energy policy in order to combat climate change. Indeed, the failure to combine growth and environmental protection—an aim which was at the core of the coalition’s ambitious program, an ambition killed off by the Russian war against Ukraine and ensuing soaring energy prices—echoes Joe Biden’s inability to sell his administration’s achievements on social and environmental justice to the US electorate or Emmanuel Macron’s planned fuel tax rise, which resulted in the 2018 gilets jaunes (Yellow Vests) uprising in France.
The relative demise of the traditionally dominant mainstream parties and the emergence of the far right as an electorally salient force in Germany took place in a context very similar to that of other Western countries.
In that respect, the relative demise of the traditionally dominant mainstream parties, the CDU and SPD (which, combined, barely represent half of the votes now), and the emergence of the far right as an electorally salient force in Germany took place in a context very similar to that of other Western countries: the resurgence of agrarian revolts amid debates over environmental justice, soaring energy prices, post-pandemic politics consisting of increasing distrust towards governing parties, scientists and the so-called “mainstream media,” social unrest due to inflation, and an extreme politicization of immigration. All this, it appears, makes up the backdrop against which a global, right-wing shift is transforming the domestic politics of many countries, well beyond the case of Germany.
At the same time, several features of the last elections clearly set them apart from previous parliamentary elections. First of all, the speed of the electoral breakthrough of the AfD is unusual: it took the party only three years to double its score, reaching an electoral weight that other, far-right parties in Europe only obtained after years of presence in the electoral arena. Second, the AfD became the second-largest party in Germany (in terms of votes) while becoming increasingly radical. This differs from other far-right parties in Europe, like the French National Rally (RN), that undertook an opposing strategy of “moderation” in their attempt to break the electoral glass ceiling. Third, these elections were characterized by a very high electoral turnout of 82.5% (the second highest since 1987), which suggests that voters perceived that there was much at stake, in a context where the level of polarization in the country was unusually high.
The AfD became the second-largest party in Germany (in terms of votes) while becoming increasingly radical. This differs from other far-right parties in Europe.
Beyond these shared characteristics these elections do represent a turning point in German and European, if not world, politics.
A Threefold Break with the Past
To begin with, these elections were watershed elections for Germany itself. Indeed, during the last decade no other country in EU-Europe has been impacted as deeply as Germany by multiple “crises”: the so-called 2015 refugee crisis, during which as many as 1.1 million asylum seekers, mainly form the Middle East, entered the country; Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, following which 1.2 million Ukrainian refugees fled to Germany; and the 2024 US presidential election and ensuing US disengagement from European security.
While the Eastern part of Germany, where the AfD came first in all states except Berlin, is still coping with the heritage of the Cold War and of the reunification process (as shown in the persistent wage gap between the two parts of the country), recent economic and (geo-)political developments undermine the three main foundations of (West-)German identity.
The first of these foundations rests on the socio-economic situation, characterized by the so-called “economic miracle” that became an integral part of the West-German success story after 1945. The second is the geopolitical component, which is comprised of Atlanticism and the external security guarantees attached to NATO. The final is the political and ethical component, embodied in the privileged place that the liberal-democratic order holds in the core philosophy of the Federal Republic of Germany. All of these foundations are now in question and facing challenges.
From Miracle to Recession
First of all, the last elections unfolded in a context of economic decline. Whereas persistent growth and the competitiveness of German industrial products on the world market had become key pillars of the West-German economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) after 1945, the German economy has been in recession for the last couple of years and is probably entering its third consecutive year of recession in 2025. Industry—notably, the car industry, which accounts for more than half of total industrial employment in the Eastern part of Germany—is being severely hit by soaring energy prices, weak domestic demand, and Chinese competition on the world market. The car plants in the Eastern states that had managed to convert to electric car production are now facing severe difficulties and are considering possible wide-ranging layoffs.
In this context, attempts by the traffic light coalition to fight climate change were defeated, notably, by the social unrest due to the increase in energy prices. Before the war in Ukraine, Germany ranked among those EU countries most dependent on the import of fossil fuel energies from Russia (which accounted for 34% of oil and 55% of gas imports). After the war began and the West responded to it, this changed dramatically, and German imports of Russian fuels decreased sharply. This situation clearly had an impact on the elections. Indeed, those who say they are “strongly worried” about the country’s future are largely over-represented within the electorate of the AfD, which has now become the first party among working-class voters, gathering nearly 40% of their votes.
A Struggling Post-Atlanticism
The geopolitical foundations of the country have been shaken to the core by the war in Ukraine and by US disengagement from European security following the last US presidential election.
Second, the geopolitical foundations of the Federal Republic of Germany have been shaken to the core by the war in Ukraine and by US disengagement from European security following the last US presidential election. US protection, low levels of spending for defense, and the so-called “checkbook diplomacy” were hallmarks of (West-)German identity. Integral to this identity was the notion of Atlanticism, i.e. an attachment to the geopolitical and military alliance with the US as a cornerstone of German foreign policy and Germany’s external security. The war in Ukraine marked an especially brutal halt to this “end of history” illusion—a shock best expressed by German chancellor Olaf Scholz in his speech before the Bundestag in February 2022, as he warned that Germans should draw lessons from this turning point (Zeitenwende) and start spending more on their own security.
Three years later, American Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 14, 2025, ten days before the parliamentary elections, brutally announced the end of the US’s commitment to European security. This new context exacerbates a number of pre-existing cleavages in Germany. Indeed, the elections illustrated the extent to which large segments of German public opinion remained opposed to an increase in military spending and attached to pacificism at any cost. Opposition to further military assistance to Ukraine, in particular, is especially strong within the electorate of the AfD, the far-left Left Party (although the latter, unlike the AfD, is not pro-Kremlin), and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a splinter from the Left Party that did not make it into the Bundestag. A rejection of further assistance to Ukraine is strongest among the youngest voting cohort and among Eastern voters, with 57% and 60% opposed respectively.
An Eroding Firewall
Third, the elections illustrated the extent to which the ethical-political foundations of the Federal Republic of Germany are now being challenged as well. Since its foundation in 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany relied on political liberalism (i.e., the rule of law, the constitutional protection of minorities, and judicial counterweights against any form of arbitrary power) as a cornerstone of its self-understanding, thereby marking a clear break with the Nazi past. This self-understanding is captured in the notion of the “liberal democratic basic order” (freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung) that is enshrined in the German constitution.
This definition of the German political regime is cemented by two pillars, a legal one and a political one. From a legal point of view, the idea is that a democratic regime should be able to defend itself against any party or force trying to undermine it. This idea is subsumed under the term “combatant democracy” (streitbare Demokratie)—sometimes referred to in the Anglophone world as “militant democracy”—which allows for the German constitutional tribunal to proscribe (i.e., ban) any party actively trying to undermine and/or abolish the liberal-democratic order. Until now, the German constitutional tribunal has only proscribed two parties: the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party (SRP) in 1952 and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in 1956.
More recently, in 2017, the tribunal decided that, while the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) advocates a racist definition of the people that is incompatible with the liberal-democratic order, it had no chance of bringing down the democratic order. The party was considered too small and too insignificant electorally to influence law-making or amend the constitution. From a political point of view, attachment to the liberal-democratic order was expressed in the “firewall” (Brandmauer) policy pursued by so-called mainstream, democratic parties against the far right—a policy consisting of abstaining from any form of engagement with the far right at all levels of government (the local, regional, federal and EU-levels). The last elections highlighted the limits and possible erosion of the legal and political norms sustaining the liberal-democratic order in Germany.
The last elections highlighted the limits and possible erosion of the legal and political norms sustaining the liberal-democratic order in Germany.
To begin with, even though the AfD became increasingly radical during the campaign, clearly standing for a definition of German identity that is not compatible with the liberal-democratic order—as illustrated, for example, by its now official plan to “remigrate” (i.e., deport) millions of “foreigners” and Germans of “foreign origin”—it is politically much more difficult to legitimize the proscription of a party that receives more than ten million votes than it is to justify the prohibition of a small party like the NPD. While specific regional chapters of the AfD have been designated as extreme-right organizations by German courts (thus opening the door to a possible proscription by the constitutional tribunal), there is no political consensus on this action, as illustrated by a debate held in the Bundestag on January 30, 2025.
The firewall strategy against the far right is now being thoroughly challenged, as voices inside the CDU increasingly question its relevance and benefit.
Moreover, the firewall strategy against the far right is now being thoroughly challenged, as voices inside the CDU increasingly question its relevance and benefit. Initially limited to the regional level where, from 2020 onwards, the formation of executives has been made increasingly difficult by the rise of the AfD, this erosion of the Brandmauer is now unfolding at the federal level as well. During the election campaign, on January 29, 2025, CDU leader and probable future chancellor Friedrich Merz put forward a resolution in the German Bundestag whose aim was to advocate an extremely restrictive immigration policy, a resolution which was eventually (though narrowly) adopted with the support of the AfD. This was a highly symbolic crack in the Brandmauer policy since it was the first time since 1949 that a mainstream party engaged in parliamentary cooperation with the far right.
However, the stakes of these elections were not only registered in Germany.
Foreign Interference and International Reverberations
These elections were also significant from the point of view of global politics. Indeed, attempts by state- and non-state foreign actors to influence the results were numerous during the campaign. Russian and US attempts at promoting the AfD were especially conspicuous. Since the 2015 refugee “crisis,” “alternative” media outlets close to the Russian executive have been spreading fake news in the German public sphere to foster public opinion against mainstream political parties and against minorities (especially refugees). What was new in this campaign was the explicit, blatant attempt by American officials of the new Trump administration to interfere in favor of the German far right. For example, Elon Musk staged an interview with AfD leader Alice Weidel on the social media platform X (which he owns) on January 10, 2025 and attended an AfD meeting virtually on January 25. Another example: Vice President Vance met with Weidel on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference in February.
What was new in this campaign was the explicit, blatant attempt by American officials of the new Trump administration to interfere in favor of the German far right.
Two reasons explain why Germany is being particularly targeted by the global far right.
First of all, Germany is being targeted as an EU heavyweight. In that respect, both Russian president Vladimir Putin and the new US administration are trying to weaken, if not destroy, the European Union, an organization which, despite its flaws, stands for political liberalism and multilateralism. Attempts by these state actors to undermine the EU also target the latter because of its regulatory powers and ambitions. This can be seen, for instance, in battles over EU regulations constraining the functioning of digital platforms, such as the Digital Market Act which forces platforms to regulate free speech. Indeed, it is no coincidence that Musk showcased such a vocal support for the AfD—an ultra-liberal party that now wishes to dismantle not only EU regulations but the European Union as such. In the same vein, in his Munich speech, Vance disparaged some of the key features of Germany’s societal model; notably, legal restrictions on hate speech on the internet. These American interventions occurred more or less concurrently with a February 7, 2025 decision by a German court, implementing the Digital Market Act, to condemn Musk’s X because of its refusal to grant researchers access to data documenting foreign attempts to interfere with the ongoing elections. Germany, due to its recent history, ranks among those EU member states that are most vocal in advocating strong European and domestic regulations aimed at combating hate speech especially.
Second—and related to the previous point—Germany is being targeted by the global far right as a symbol of political liberalism and antifascism. This was quite conspicuous in the attacks launched by Vance and Musk against the German “liberal order.” Vance, in his Munich speech, disparaged a number of “liberal-minded” EU countries but especially criticized the allegedly pro-immigration stance of German elites and their firewall containment policy against the far right as being “undemocratic.” In that respect, it should be remembered that if the firewall against the AfD were to break down in Germany, it could very well have consequences for other EU countries where anti-Europe, far-right, parties are close to coming to power at the national level. A case in point is France, where the firewall policy traditionally pursued by the heirs to Gaullism against the far right is cracking—during the 2024 general elections, the leader of the conservative Republicans party (LR) chose to put up common lists with the far-right National Rally.
For those campaigning in the US against critical race theory and, more generally, for all those who wish to engage in a revisionist rewriting of history in their own countries, the German “liberal, democratic basic order” is abhorrent.
Beyond that, attempts by the US far right to skew the elections in favor of the AfD also serve to make antifascism and anti-Nazism irrelevant as a shared moral compass in politics. In that respect, it should be remembered that the Federal Republic of Germany has long been considered a “model” for its “Vergangenheitsbewältigung,” i.e., the ability to critically examine and draw lessons from one’s past. The constant examination and exposure of Nazi crimes and the commitment to combat any form of ideology echoing National Socialism are key foundations of the liberal-democratic order (a fact which, until the reunification of the country in 1990, did not apply to the eastern German Democratic Republic, where only the capitalist Federal Republic was considered morally responsible for Nazi crimes). For those campaigning in the US against critical race theory and, more generally, for all those who wish to engage in a revisionist rewriting of history in their own countries, the German “liberal, democratic basic order” is abhorrent. It is against this backdrop that Elon Musk’s statement at the above-mentioned AfD rally, where he said to AfD activists that they “should get rid of the guilt” (associated with the Nazi past), should be analyzed.
At this point, it remains uncertain whether the firewall policy put up by the “mainstream” parties—and especially by the CDU—will endure into the near future. Certainly, the massive demonstrations held in several German cities during the campaign against the AfD and against the temptation to give up the Brandmauer policy clearly show that there is no massive shift to the (far-)right in German society or in the electorate at large. Nevertheless, political liberalism and the typically German philosophy of the “liberal democratic basic order” are being challenged like never before. Next to domestic factors (like the ability of a CDU-led coalition to undermine the appeal of the far right), geopolitical factors such as the war in Ukraine and the evolution of the EU will certainly play a role in the future of the pro-liberal orientation of German politics.
Cécile Leconte is Professor of political science at Sciences Po Lille and researcher with the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Administratives, Politiques et Sociales (CERAPS).
Image made by John Chrobak using “UA Marder 1A3 IFV in training,” by 199th Training Centre licensed under CC Attribution 4.0 International; “VW Werk Altes Heizkraftwerk WB edit,” by Richard Bartz licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported; “2019-04-11 Pressekonferenz der AfD by Olaf Kosinsky-8110,” by Olaf Kosinsky licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Germany; “2024-08-21 Event, CDU, Wahlkampf mit Friedrich Merz in Erfurt 2024 STP 3071 by Stepro,” by Steffen Prößdorf licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International; “Wahlplakate Bundestagswahl 2025 Scholz und Merz,” by conceptphoto.info licensed under CC Attribution 2.0 Generic; “MLPD-Wahlplakat Make Socialism great again zur Bundestagswahl 2025 Leipziger Straße Frankfurt am Main,” by conceptphoto.info licensed under CC Attribution 2.0 Generic; “2025-01-23 Politik, SPD-Kanzlerkandidat Olaf Scholz im Gespräch in Erfurt STP 6020,” by Steffen Prößdorf licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International.
