In less than a decade, violence has shifted from being a diffuse and occasional practice to becoming a constant in Brazilian political life. According to the human rights organizations Terra de Direitos and Justiça Global, violence against elected officeholders, candidates, or primary candidates has significantly increased[1] in the past four years in Brazil. Electoral violence, characterized by actions that destabilize the electoral cycle and consequently its results, can occur in any political environment, whether through isolated or large-scale acts, and it can have noticeable impacts on the political landscape. In this context, a new figure has emerged: Pablo Marçal (Brazilian Labor Renewal Party: PRTB), a candidate for mayor of São Paulo,[2] whose behavior combines a set of methods and techniques aimed at manipulating emotions, reflecting in the increase in political violence in Brazil.[3]
Rise of Political Violence
Political violence is broadly defined as any form of aggression aimed at interfering with the actions of political leaders, such as limiting political and parliamentary activity, silencing voices, imposing interests, eliminating opponents from the race, restricting campaign activities, dissuading opponents from participating in the electoral process, and/or preventing elected officials from taking office.[4] An Observatory of Political and Electoral Violence (Observatório da Violência Política e Eleitoral) survey found that there were eight cases in the first quarter of year 2024, 36 in the second, and 173 in the third quarter. The state of São Paulo leads the ranking with 30 cases, followed by Rio de Janeiro with 19, and the Northeastern state of Piauí with 14.[5] The survey also detailed the types of violence: 94 cases of physical violence, 49 of psychological violence, 19 of economic violence, and 11 of symbolic violence. Physical violence during electoral debates, such as the use of padlocks and punches, has been a concerning new trend this year, according to the data collected.[6]
There are many reasons for the rise of political violence, such as the weakening of democratic institutions and the antidemocratic tendencies of extremists who often present themselves as apolitical. According to Robert Pape, there are catalysts for partisan manipulation and polarization, among which are social media and antidemocratic digital militias. The Brazilian Supreme Court has established that “digital militias”[7] are the virtual frontlines of criminal organizations, with a strong digital presence, articulated across various sectors (political, production, publishing, and financing) aimed at undermining democracy and the rule of law.
Electoral contests have become targets of political violence. Through strategies and methods employed both inside and outside traditional media, candidates vie for the votes of a distrustful and disillusioned electorate. Using underhanded tactics, cancel culture techniques, humiliation, and various technologies including, recently, the use of artificial intelligence, candidates have been behaving more disruptively, intensifying hostility in Brazilian politics.
Populism and the Criminalization of Politics
In this scenario, Pablo Marçal stands out as a classic example of a populist who uses the criminalization of politics as a method to present himself as a savior. He positions himself as someone outside the traditional political system, an authentic, uncorrupted entrepreneur who promises to cleanse politics of all corruption and lead his electorate to success. He turns adversaries into enemies and presents himself as an antipolitician: pure, authentic, and honest. But is political violence acceptable? The populist movement sometimes verges on fascist behavior, employing tactics used to seize power in liberal democracies which can be summarized as: take power, eliminate rivals, rule through terror and fear, control the truth, create a new society, and govern forever.
Characteristics of Far-Right Populists on the Brazilian Political Scene
We can observe some common characteristics that indicate a strong and transversal trend in the behavior of political outsiders who seek to gain political power in Brazil through typical far-right populist methods, such as Pablo Marçal. In this sense, we highlight the following metrics:
- To be an extreme right-wing populist with media and social appeal involves propagating a “truth” constructed by one’s own narrative, choosing scapegoats, purchasing people’s loyalty, and saying what the people want to hear.
- Believe in yourself. Authoritarians present themselves with unwavering self-confidence and a megalomaniacal posture, capable of transforming reality according to their desire. In the Brazilian context, they are liberators, supported by the religious beliefs of the majority of the people, propagating mythical conspiracy theories with passionate speeches and hatred of the enemy. Try to resurrect the dead and promote the strength of your faith!
- Have many followers across social platforms. The message must be spread because indignation sells! The enemies of the people are your enemies, and only you can defeat them. Followers will believe because resentment unites people.
- Be a servant of the people. The face of the nation is homogeneous, there is no diversity or multiculturalism. Wear clothing and accessories that identify you with the people, like caps and carteira de trabalho.[8] The important thing is to be a part of the masses and serve as their direct, authentic representative. Offer salvation and stir up distrust in democratic institutions. Foment polarization and antagonism regularly.
- Create a movement brand and bet on individual donors. This is an important political marketing strategy using the power of image and symbolism. It’s the movement’s identity using, especially, psychological coercion with strident nationalist enthusiasm that amounts to intimidation. Do not bother with the niceties of current electoral, constitutional, and democratic policies, such as party funds that are traceable and controlled. Use virtual crowdfunding among your followers.
- Choose when and which opponent to attack. The goal is to emotionally destabilize the enemy. Eliminate opposition with violent, intimidating rhetoric, establishing dominance and control over rivals.
- Be omnipresent through mastery of manipulation and ubiquity techniques on social networks. Be everywhere. Dominate all senses, especially inciting fear. Break with tradition and buy loyalty with promises capable of psychologically deceiving the masses. Develop rituals of humiliation for enemies with special use of spectacle and keep rivals frightened and disoriented.
- Be an outsider entrepreneur. Reject public social policies and overvalue individual achievements, which is the logic of the neoliberal system. Leave your legacy as a coach or influencer to manipulate, induce, and persuade the masses to succeed in business through their own individual effort and hard work. Sell personal development courses, embrace the prosperity gospel, and present yourself as God’s chosen one.
The Example of Nayib Bukele
Nayib Bukele, President of El Salvador, who has made his country more autocratic, enjoys the admiration and unconditional support of Pablo Marçal. According to a post on his Instagram account and on Terra, Pablo Marçal highlights Bukele’s success as mayor of San Salvador and the reduction in homicides in the country. On his social networks, and during his trip to El Salvador, Marçal made a video highlighting Bukele’s success and referring to the country’s public security. Almost all democratic progress achieved in the past two decades had disappeared by the end of 2023, after just five years of Bukele as president. His political party’s platform calls for arbitrary arrests that would be legitimized by the executive as populist salvationist measures against organized crime, and federal legislative actions supporting these under the pretext of fighting gang violence. These promote the arbitrary arrests of civil society actors, journalists, judges, academics, and human rights defenders, as well as changes in the rules on term limits for re-election. The dismantling of the judiciary in May 2021 transformed El Salvador into an electoral autocracy,[9] according to the Varieties of Democracy Institute’s (V-Dem) 2023 report. Bukele’s penal populism became a model of law and order, resulting in one of the largest prison populations in the world and turning prison construction into a major business. Used by Bukele and defended by the Marçal campaign, penal populism can be considered a variable property of populism and serves as a significant metric for taking the electorate’s temperature.
The initial battle against criminal organizations has yielded results in reducing homicide rates, earning Bukele the approval not only of the majority of Salvadorans but also of millions of citizens throughout Latin America.[10] His methods have become a tool of foreign policy and a driving force in electoral disputes across the region, along the same lines as Pablo Marçal. According to Breda, politicians across the hemisphere have recognized the opportunity to leverage Bukele’s success for their own benefit.[11] Opposition figures in Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, and Argentina have used Bukele’s actions as a benchmark to criticize the relative inaction of their national governments on security.[12] For example, presidential candidates in Guatemala have promised to follow in Bukele’s footsteps if elected.[13] Marçal’s political strategy was to declare a metaphorical war on crime in order to promote public security, echoing Bukele’s approach.
Popular Support and Polls
Recent polls such as Veritá, Real Big Time Data, Quaest, Futura, Datafolha, and Paraná Pesquisas, with some variations, indicate at least 20% of São Paulo’s electorate would vote for Pablo Marçal. Those who support political violence believe that the political elites are entirely corrupt, which leads to a tendency to support entrepreneurs, or outsiders, who are not already part of the political establishment and whose support is not limited to residents of favelas (shantytowns) on the city’s outskirts. In the 2024 municipal elections’ first round, Pablo Marçal secured 28.14% of the vote, finishing in third place and closely trailing the first- and second-place candidates. Guilherme Boulos, who advanced to the second round, received 29.07%, while the leading candidate, Ricardo Nunes, garnered 29.48% of the electorate’s votes.
According to Bomfim, some voters view acts of political violence between candidates as a form of entertainment. Verbal or physical aggression during debates contributes to the rise of hate campaigns and violence, and the “professionalization of hate” in politics, with real-time impact on social networks, can drive the electoral growth of certain candidates. One explanation for this is that a significant portion of those in the online community are not part of the labor market and view politics with detachment, disinterest, and fatigue toward so-called traditional politicians. This paves the way for candidates who position themselves as anti-establishment.
According to a Datafolha survey released on September 22, 2024, Pablo Marçal had stronger support among men, with support from 28% of them—more than those who preferred Guilherme Boulos (PSOL), at 22%, or Ricardo Nunes (MDB), at 18%. He gained ground among former President Jair Bolsonaro’s supporters and showed greater strength among the poorest and evangelicals. Marçal also stood out among voters with education up to the high school level, white voters, and those from low-income families.[14]
Conclusion
From the analysis of some converging and diverging characteristics between the strategies and tactics of populists, we identify Pablo Marçal as a far-right populist with a strong media appeal, displaying pronounced narcissism and having many followers. He presents himself as a servant of the people, creates the brand of his movement, and bets on individual donations to his campaign. Through the “Marçalesque” method, he selectively chooses when and which opponent to attack. He styles himself as an omnipresent and omnipotent being with a commanding voice, mastering the art of manipulation, and considers himself a successful outsider entrepreneur akin to the sacred success of the prosperity gospel.
As we previously announced in another essay, toxic polarization is paralyzing our democracy. The war declared by far-right politicians against their political enemies is fueling hatred, violence, and diminishing dialog within democratic systems. In this context, popular representatives have become characters whose political function is to wage the culture war and unprecedented narratives supported by the popular masses. They are elected for their verbosity and maintain their popularity through the flood of likes they receive from their irascible followers.
Exacerbated polarization serves as a strategic tool to enable institutional reforms and formal and informal movements to undermine democracy, paving the way for autocracy—a path that may have no return.
Undoubtedly, our time … Prefers the image to the thing, the copy to the original, the representation to reality, appearance to being … What is sacred to him is none other than illusion, but what is profane is the truth. Better yet, the sacred grows in his eyes as truth diminishes, and illusion increases, so that for him the peak of illusion is also the peak of the sacred. (Ludwig Feuerbach, preface to the 2nd edition of The Essence of Christianity, 1843)
Feuerbach’s words are pertinent to the current context of Brazilian politics, especially concerning Pablo Marçal’s style. The preference for image, copy, and representation over reality and truth reflects the way Marçal and other far-right populists manipulate public perception. They create an illusion of power and authority which, although profane in its essence, is viewed as sacred by their followers. This illusion is fueled by the use of spectacle and emotional manipulation, which are powerful tools for destabilizing democracy and promoting political violence.
[1] The research project carried out by Terra de Direitos and published as “Political and Electoral Violence in Brazil: Panorama of Human Rights Violations between September 2, 2020 and October 2, 2022,” mapped 523 illustrative cases of political violence from September 2, 2020 to October 2, 2022, the date on which the first round of Brazil’s presidential elections took place. There were 163 murders and attacks against political agents, 151 threats, 94 assaults, and 106 other offenses. (The applied methodology describes such offenses as “discriminatory acts, particularly insults and verbal aggression, with strong racist, misogynistic, and homophobic content, directed at political figures, collectives, or individuals belonging to ethnic, racial, cultural, economic, religious, and gender identity groups that have historically faced discrimination,” as well as cases of invasion and episodes of attempted arrests, removal from office by state officials, and unlawful detention of political figures. A considerable number of cases are concentrated in 2022, which even before the start of the electoral period registered more cases than the whole of 2021. See https://terradedireitos.org.br/violencia-politica-e-eleitoral-no-brasil/.
[2] The race for the mayor of São Paulo was fiercely contested between Ricardo Nunes of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro: MDB), Guilherme Boulos of the Socialism and Liberty Party (Partido Socialismo e Liberdade: PSOL), and Pablo Marçal of the Brazilian Labor Renewal Party (Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro: PRTB).
[3] According to researcher Nara Oliveira Salles at the University of Campinas’ (Unicamp) Center for the Study of Public Opinion (Centro para o Estudo da Opinião Pública: Cesop), the violence in the campaign for the municipal elections in the city of São Paulo has drawn nationwide attention, with numerous minor incidents involving punches, and verbal abuse. A survey by the Observatory of Political and Electoral Violence at the Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (Unirio) found that 455 cases of violence involving political leaders were recorded in Brazil between January 1 and September 16, 2024. São Paulo is the state with the highest number of cases, with 29, followed by Rio de Janeiro, with 20, and Piauí, with 14. The states of Ceará and Bahia have 13 cases each, and Paraíba has 12. See TV Unicamp, “A violência política para além de Pablo Marçal,” YouTube, September 30, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXOHVqKZQl0.
[4] The definition of political violence was constructed from the extraction of signs based on research by Felipe Borba, Vinícius Israel, Miguel P. Carnevale, and Pedro Bahia, “Violência política e eleitoral nas eleições municipais de 2020,” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 37, no.108 (2022), e3710803; Norbert Elias, Michael Schröter, The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 1996); Justiça Global, “Relatório sobre violência política e eleitoral no Brasil,” 2022, https://static.poder360.com.br/2022/10/violencia-politica-10out-2022.pdf.
[5] See https://terradedireitos.org.br/violencia-politica-e-eleitoral-no-brasil/.
It should be further noted that, according to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística: IBGE), the estimated population of Piauí as of 2024 is 3,375,646, that for Rio de Janeiro is 16,729,894, and that for São Paulo is 45,973,194. As such, the per capita incidence in Piauí is actually far higher than in either Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo states.
[6] The research methodology defines cases of violence according to the following types—physical violence: a set of actions aimed at causing harm or injury to the body and/or life, resulting in death or physical injury to the victim(s); and psychological violence, characterized by its impact on the mental and emotional well-being of the affected victims. In Brazil, psychological violence, especially against women, can be characterized by the frequent interruption of speech in political environments; the evident dispersion of interlocutors; the clear signaling of discredit; disqualification: inducing people to think that they are not competent for the issue; the classification of women as hysterical; defamation; intimidation, which includes aggressive gestures and words; and threats. In this sense, the Brazilian courts recognize that political violence is an attack on the democratic system, fundamental and human rights. There is also the concept of economic violence, as expressed through the withholding of financial resources, acts of vandalism, theft, or any other method used to economically weaken a political actor—for example, in Brazil, when party funds are allocated disproportionately, excluding women from the distribution. There is also sexual violence, which includes behaviors expressed through unwanted sexual advances or actions directed at a political leader.
[7] Supremo Tribunal Federal. Inquérito Penal (INQ) 4874/ 2022. This investigation was opened to determine the existence of a criminal organization, with strong digital presence and with production, publishing, financing, and political centers similar to those identified in Inq. 4.781/DF, with the clear purpose of undermining democracy and the rule of law.
[8] The Brazilian carteira de trabalho (work card) is a record of one’s work history, bound together with one’s social security booklet. It was created in 1969 and contains annotations that record all of a worker’s formal-sector professional history in Brazil. This booklet is essential for access to labor rights, such as unemployment insurance and social security benefits, and in Brazil has a strong political appeal because it represents the political struggle of workers who receive a fixed salary and have guaranteed fundamental rights.
[9] El Salvador had been democratizing very slowly since 1992. It achieved electoral democracy status in 1998 and continued to progress until around 2014. Re-autocratization began in 2018 and the country now ranks first in terms of the magnitude of decline terms of re-autocratization. Almost all the democratic progress achieved over the previous two decades had disappeared by the end of 2023—in only five years of President Bukele’s rule. For more information, see V-DEm Methodology, available at https://www.v-dem.net/about/v-dem-project/methodology/.
[10] See Marina Nord, Martin Lundstedt, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Cecilia Borella, Tiago Fernandes, Lisa Gastaldi, Ana Good God, Natalia Natsika, and Staffan I. Lindberg, “Relatório da democracia 2024: A democracia a ganhar e perder nas urnas,” University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, Portuguese Edition, trans. Joana Rafael Pereira, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, https://www.v-dem.net/documents/49/v-dem_dr_2024_portuguese_lowres.pdf.
[11] Tiziano Breda, “Why El Salvador’s Anti-Crime Measures Cannot (and Should Not) Be Exported,” Rome, Instituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Commentaries 23, no. 16 (March 2023), p. 2, https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom2316.pdf.
[12] According to Daniel Canosa, some advocates suggest replicating his approach despite its controversial nature. In Ecuador, following the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, martial law was declared, mimicking Bukele’s tactics. Similarly, in Colombia, political discourse is increasingly influenced by Bukele’s methods, with figures like Diego Molano proposing megaprisons, something that Argentina has already started emulating. Chile’s political landscape has also been impacted, with right-wing factions advocating for tougher stances inspired by Bukele’s policies. Daniel Canosa, “The Pitfalls of Replicating El Salvador’s Security Model across Latin America,” May 30, 2024, Agency for Peacebuilding (think tank), https://www.peaceagency.org/the-pitfalls-of-replicating-el-salvadors-security-model-across-latin-america/.
[13] Former First Lady Sandra Torres, of the National Unity of Hope party, announced her platform to cheering supporters at a hotel in May, saying she would implement Bukele’s strategies “to end the scourge of homicides, murders and extortion in our country.” She said she would build two mega-prisons for gang members.
[14] The Datafolha survey was conducted from September 20–21, 2024, registered with the Electoral Court under number SP-08344/2024, and was commissioned by the Folha de S. Paulo newspaper and TV Globo. It included interviews with 1,204 voters in the city of São Paulo, which is the capital of the state of the same name.
Carina Barbosa Gouvêa is Professor in the master’s- and doctoral-level law program at the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE); she was a postdoctoral fellow in constitutional law at UFPE, she received her doctoral and master’s degrees in law from Estácio de Sá University (UNESA). She serves as coordinator of the Theory of the Separation of Powers and Crisis in the Brazilian Democratic System Working Group at UFPE, and she is deputy leader of the International Law and Human Rights Working Group supported by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq).
Pedro H. Villas Bôas Castelo Branco is Associate Professor at the Rio de Janeiro State University’s (UERJ) Institute of Social and Political Studies; he received his doctorate in political science from the University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), his master’s in political theory and constitutional law from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). He serves as coordinator of UERJ’s Defense and Public Security Studies Laboratory, as a Rio de Janeiro State research scientist for the National Education Council’s Carlos Chagas Filho Foundation for the Support of Research in Rio de Janeiro, and is a CNPq Productivity Fellow.
Photo made by John Chrobak using “Pablo Marçal entrevista Kim Kataguiri” by Kim Kataguiri licensed under CC BY 3.0.
