Michael, thank you for taking the time to speak with us. I want to start with your 2022 article on demobilizing far-right demonstrations and campaigns. In it, you present a causal mechanism that explains how far-right activity can be demobilized by a combination of actions taken by non-state and state actors. First, can you walk us through that sequence and expound upon what you theorize there?
Political extremists of all doctrinal stripes mobilize in democratic societies, and many do it in ostensibly non-violent ways. This was the case with a campaign in Germany that saw annual memorial marches to honor Rudolf Hess, one of Hitler’s chief acolytes. Leading neo-Nazis organized demonstrations through Hess’s hometown in northeastern Bavaria, claiming only to mourn a person but of course using the occasion to promote extreme right views. Such mobilization poses a challenge to state actors about how to police that activity and whether banning action should be taken.
This challenge is especially acute in Germany because of its history, but also in other states that could be called “militant democracies,” i.e., regimes that include laws and institutions to disrupt extremist attempts to undermine the liberal democratic constitutional order. Generally, democratic states are reluctant to limit freedoms of speech and association—with good reason since these are fundamental to liberal democracy. Many societal actors are less squeamish and more insistent about policing the borders of legitimate participation in the democratic public sphere and illegitimate hate speech, incitement, or discriminatory activity. Against the Hess campaign, antifascist activists violently counter-mobilized with the aim of stopping neo-Nazi activism. State authorities, jolted out of passive acceptance of the Hess campaign because now there were violent clashes in this town, imposed demonstration bans for this locality around the typical date of the march.
In a comparative study (summarized here) of far-right campaigns, I find this pattern repeated in many cases: private actors problematize far-right activity and spur state authorities into action. Counter-mobilization is often crucial to demobilize far-right activity, whether by directly deterring far-right actors or by compelling state actors to intervene.
We live in a world where the far right, despite provoking counter-mobilization and even being the object of state repression in some cases, is increasingly normalized, mainstreamed, and closer to the halls of power than it has been in a very long time (if it’s not in them already). What does this tell us about the viability of the “negative demobilization” strategy you outline in the article mentioned above? Is the rise of the far right—culturally and politically— a result of too little “kamikaze counter-mobilization” plus state repression, or is this strategy itself not adequate to the task anymore, and needs to be replaced?
Societal actors often counter-mobilize against the far right, but this is rarely sufficient on its own to demobilize far-right activity and organizations. In many cases, the reason far-right actors have been normalized, mainstreamed, and welcomed into halls of power is because—sadly—the normal, mainstream inhabitants of those halls have opened the doors to the far right. Several studies have shown that (partially) adopting far-right policy stances, on issues like immigration, does not effectively “win back” votes from far-right parties; it merely strengthens the credibility of those far-right parties.
The reason far-right actors have been normalized, mainstreamed, and welcomed into halls of power is because—sadly—the normal, mainstream inhabitants of those halls have opened the doors.
Yet mainstream parties have repeatedly fallen into this trap and continue to do so—to their detriment. Research on militant democracy demonstrates that cordons sanitaire, i.e., a collective refusal to engage with extreme parties, is effective only when it is thorough, when the consistent position from mainstream parties is “this party and its positions are not normal and not legitimate within our liberal democratic constitution.” When mainstream parties break rank from the cordon sanitaire, it is only the far-right party that benefits. Counter-mobilization can do much to demobilize the far right, but it needs the support of political elites and state actors to be lastingly effective.
Two more questions on this article. First, I wondered if you might comment on our digital age, where mass politics on the street is giving way to (or at least being complimented by) digital activism, which the far right has proven itself to be adept at exploiting. Do you find the strategy of negative demobilization to be adaptable to this new digital environment?
I think this is one of the great challenges confronting modern liberal democracy. The advent of mass digital tools has expanded the public sphere and, as well as facilitating many parts of our lives, made it easier than ever for extremists to connect, recruit, network, organize, agitate, and act. In recent years, the capacities afforded by digital tools have enabled far-right individuals and groups to harass political opponents, attack state offices (including multiple national legislatures!), and perpetrate numerous acts of political violence. So far, liberal democratic states have not developed and implemented sufficient measures to curb extremism in online platforms in the way they do for the town square.
But there are encouraging developments in this area as recent incidents have alerted policymakers to the pressing need to address extremism in some online spaces. Already we have seen the negative demobilization of some far-right actors in the digital sphere as platform companies, sometimes at the behest of state authorities, have deplatformed individuals and groups. Whether states can extend the standards, the widely accepted limits on freedoms of speech and association to the digital town square will be decisive for the future of liberal democracy.
Secondly, what are the risks of a negative demobilization strategy? By this, I don’t mean risks of poor effectiveness, etc. but rather the risks for groups who are not far right but have an interest in mobilization campaigns. Can we ensure that a strategy that relies on emboldening and justifying state repression will not eventually be turned on non-far-right groups? Many on the left, for instance, feel that their campaigns for climate justice or Palestinian solidarity have been repressed using the same coercive tools, but centrist/liberal groups too could be repressed if the radical right were to enter government in any given country. How do you think about these tradeoffs and potentialities?
This is certainly the perilous balance that activists have to mind. Historically, more than any one societal actor, the greatest threat to liberal, open societies is the excessive exercise of state power. Fear of that threat should not lead to rejecting the use of state powers, but neither can recourse to those powers be rash or blithe. Many opponents of far-right groups do not intend to appeal for state intervention when they counter-mobilize against the far right. Activists are rightly wary of the precedents and other applications of state repression.
More than any one societal actor, the greatest threat to liberal, open societies is the excessive exercise of state power. Fear of that threat should not lead to rejecting the use of state powers, but neither can recourse to those powers be rash or blithe.
Yet in many instances, the far right would not demobilize without state intervention. In other cases of mobilization—we can point to many—state repression has been applied and, I would argue, without the sort of sound legal justifications that there are in far-right cases. Far-right actors are often trying to subvert the liberal democratic constitutional order; the same cannot be said of climate activists. Nevertheless, I suspect that where, when, and against whom liberal democratic states’ repressive powers are applied is (usually) a reflection of wider societal attitudes and what is generally perceived as legitimate. To ensure state repression is not excessive, there is no easy solution, no ready-made legal test that can be applied. Vigilance and engagement by citizens is required. This is the ultimate check and balance on state power. If this balancing act of liberal democracy sounds precarious, that’s because it is.
I think this brings us nicely to your 2023 article on proscribing right-wing extremist organizations in Europe. Proscription is, as you say, the most severe legal instrument that states can use against extremist organizations and one that comes in different forms. Can you talk to us about the differences between executive and judicial proscriptions? What are the advantages of one or the other of these forms and what variances can we observe in Europe with regard to different states’ capacity (or proclivity) for proscribing extremist movements?
Broadly, there are two ways organizations are proscribed: (1) a part of the executive branch (often the interior ministry), after monitoring or assessing an organization, determines that its organizational activity violates the law and issues a proscription order, which may be subject to judicial review; (2) a state or non-state actor files suit against an organization, which is heard by a judicial body (usually a high court) that issues a ruling that an organization is fundamentally incompatible with the law and therefore illegal, dissolved, kaput.
The main trade-offs associated with the judicial and executive forms of proscription concern speed and precision.
The main trade-offs associated with the judicial and executive forms of proscription concern speed and precision. If there is a right-wing extremist organization operating illegally, then one of the main advantages of proscribing it is to disrupt its extremist activity. Being able to act quickly, order proscription, seize organization assets and arrest members in one swoop is possible through the executive mode of proscription. Executive assessments may be faulty, though, and judicial review might overturn proscription orders (and executive proscription power is another area where the threat of state overreach, mentioned above, is significant). Because proscription is such a severe instrument and because the danger of excessive state repression should be guarded against, proscription processes may go through the judiciary, where organizations can defend themselves and justify the legitimacy of their activity.
Of course, long judicial processes also offer extremist organizations the chance to shift resources and members, to adjust so that the impact of any eventual proscription order is minimal. Most European states that have laws enabling proscription have the judicial mode, but the most active states (Germany, France, the United Kingdom) have the executive mode. This is no coincidence. While the different modes of proscription are not the only explanatory factor for the rates of proscription—the U.K., France, and especially Germany have large right-wing extremist scenes—acting through the executive definitely makes proscription a more accessible legal instrument.
Building on this, I’d like you to comment on something relevant to us today, which is the push to proscribe the Alternative for Germany (AfD). As you note in the aforementioned article, Germany has been the most active country in Europe in terms of proscription, but (in the postwar era) has also never faced a far-right political force as formidable as the AfD. While the decision to ban the party would ultimately be made on legal and not political grounds, I am curious to hear your perspective on such an event. If it were to happen, what might the effects be? In your view, would this be an effective long-term solution to the demand that now exists in Germany for a far-right party? Or is proscription always a necessary but insufficient tool for liberal-democratic regimes?
First, we have to acknowledge that although proscription is ultimately decided on legal grounds, it stems from political motivations. This is so even in cases less politically charged than the AfD. In a paper currently under review at the European Journal of Political Research, looking at the causal conditions surrounding proscription of organizations in Germany since 1990, I find that governments have proscribed organizations at least in part as a response to a more general concern about far-right mobilization, underscoring that bans are used not purely in a targeted manner but also pragmatically, a signal of government responsiveness. This finding accords with research on political party bans, which has found that other parties have decisive functions as veto players in the decision of whether to file suit to proscribe a far-right party.
In the case of the AfD—and other far-right parties—it is important to note that there is usually a higher legal threshold required to justify proscribing a party. Rightly so. Political parties are a recognized, privileged grouping in most democratic systems, so extra caution is warranted when considering any designation that might inhibit political parties’ activity. In Germany, the government has shied away from pursuing a ban of the AfD because it is risky: it is not clear if there is sufficient evidence (of the type accepted by the high court) to justify proscription. Moreover, the signals from Germany’s mainstream right, chiefly the CDU, have not suggested support for attempting to ban the AfD.
Banning parties is a late if not last resort to protect democracy, but recourse to that tool in many ways signals more fundamental failures of democratic politics.
Putting those impediments aside and imagining what the effects would be, proscription would not resolve the more fundamental electoral demand for a far-right party. I suspect AfD voters would switch to support other right-wing parties or to other far-right parties, in either case hoping to recreate the AfD in another party. Banning parties is a late if not last resort to protect democracy, but recourse to that tool in many ways signals more fundamental failures of democratic politics. Far-right parties thrive off some voters’ grievances; they are most successful when those grievances are most acute. Across Europe, survey data shows that significant blocks of voters feel aggrieved by certain conditions that mainstream parties have not sufficiently addressed. Effective resistance to the threat of far-right parties may well involve proscription, but it must certainly involve policies that address voters’ grievances, which have been compounded by a series of crises.
More than the possible act of banning the AfD, I think the discussion of a ban, that it is a plausible option, is good. Discussion of a ban is inherently a discussion about the boundaries of legitimate political activity within the liberal democratic constitutional order. That is a healthy discussion to have in a democratic society. And just talking about the possibility reinforces the fact that the AfD is a far-right party and not a normal democratic party.
Finally, I want to close with the question we always ask, which is about illiberalism as a concept. We have mostly talked about extremism today, or the far right. But how do you assess illiberalism? Do you find it to be a useful concept? And how do you think it relates to other terms like far right, etc.?
I understand illiberalism essentially as the rejection of liberal values (chiefly minority rights), usually in favor of strident majoritarianism. This is a useful concept to capture a core ideological feature of many important political actors. Many contemporary political parties which are classified as far-right because of certain other ideological features are also accurately categorized as illiberal. These concepts are connected to each other, but describe important and different features.
Michael C. Zeller is an Assistant Professor in comparative politics at the Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für Politikwissenschaft (GSI) at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. He earned a Ph.D. in political science from Central European University’s Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations in 2023. He studies political violence and far-right socio-politics and collaborates with colleagues on an array of topics within the area of comparative politics.
