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In late September, Austria held landmark elections that promised to reshape its political landscape. The populist, radical-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) emerged as the clear winner with nearly 28.8% of the popular vote—this is its highest tally ever, slightly higher than the 27% it secured in 1999. Its new leader Herbert Kickl clearly sees his strategy and political program vindicated. The governing Christian conservative People’s Party (ÖVP), in power already for 37 years but trailing badly in the opinion polls since last year, was playing catch-up after its former political superstar, then-Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, resigned in disgrace in 2021 following an indictment and conviction on perjury charges. His successor, Chancellor Karl Nehammer, ultimately failed to close the gap and achieved 26.3%, an 11% drop from the figure secured in Kurz’ 2019 triumph. Stuck in an uneasy coalition with the center-left Greens, the ÖVP stumbled from one public corruption scandal to the next, facing numerous investigations by anti-corruption authorities that the Green justice minister politically protected. Differing visions on climate policy, the economy, and immigration were sources of constant friction and public controversy. Only a steep decline in public approval ratings kept the coalition together, as neither party was interested in facing the voters early on.

Yet, the biggest political loser of the night was the opposition Social Democrats (SPÖ) and its new leader Andreas Babler, who had positioned the party markedly to the left. The SPÖ had its worst showing ever with 21%, albeit the losses relative to its previous worst were marginal (dropping only 0.1%). By contrast, the governing Greens lost more than a third of their voters and ended up with 8.3% of the vote. Besides the FPÖ, only the small liberal party New Austria (NEOS) managed to increase their standing by achieving 9.2%, which may turn out to be relevant when the new parliament tries to find a majority and form a coalition government without the Freedom Party.

Several smaller protest parties that looked like they might cross the 4% threshold to enter parliament ultimately failed to gain traction. Their failure ironically means that the 183 seats in the Austrian parliament will have to be divided between five parties, rather than six or seven had these smaller protest parties made it through. In this way, the SPÖ actually managed to gain one seat. It is the distribution of seats that matters for the formation of a coalition government, which needs at least 92 seats to have the smallest possible majority.

Nonetheless, this was an election unlike any in Austria’s postwar history. For the first time, the FPÖ emerged as the strongest party and now has a clear claim to the chancellorship and the right to form a government. For the first time, neither the Conservatives nor the Social Democrats—the founding parties of modern Austria and the, traditionally, major centrist forces—emerged victorious.

Engaged Voters, Unprecedented Result

These were issue elections and turned on topics that favored the radical right. By far the most important issue, according to 24% of the electorate,1 was immigration and then asylum and crime, followed by concerns about the pension system and the welfare state. These issues were decisive for voters: 65% of FPÖ voters chose the radical right party because of its position on immigration, while 43% of SPÖ voters were most concerned about the welfare state and 73% of Green voters about climate. The conservatives scored on economic competence (35%) and to a lesser degree on immigration (15%).

These were issue elections and turned on topics that favored the radical right. By far the most important issue was immigration and then asylum and crime…

The SPÖ had the largest share of strategic voters, many of whom were former Greens who voted for the Social Democrats to prevent a coalition government led by the FPÖ under Kickl. Personalities played a minor role. Even Chancellor Nehammer was only a motivating factor for 9% of the ÖVP voters, which is negligible compared to the political popularity that the head of government usually enjoys. Initial analysis shows that the FPÖ did well across the country, besting the other parties in four of Austria’s nine federal states. It scored its best results with voters under-50, and performed particularly well among the young. Only the large share of pensioners saved the Social Democrats and Conservatives from an even worse defeat.

Liberal-Democratic Drift?

The Austrian elections followed regional elections in neighboring Germany, where the far-right Alternative for Germany, a party ideologically and politically linked to the FPÖ, emerged stronger than ever. With Hungary and Slovakia also led by radical populist and Eurosceptic politicians, there is a risk that Central Europe will turn away from liberal democracy. In Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as in large parts of the Balkans and Italy, nationalist and populist parties and politicians are either in power or form the main opposition. In the Austrian elections, the question was whether the country would follow this trend.

For some, the Freedom Party’s strong showing may not seem new, as it has already been part of the government four times. However, its normalization is something new.

For some, the Freedom Party’s strong showing may not seem new, as it has already been part of the government four times, most recently from 2017 to 2019. However, its normalization is something new. When it entered public office alongside the Conservatives in 2000, for instance, EU member states imposed sanctions on the ÖVP-FPÖ government. This did not deter the FPÖ and in the 2016 runoff election for the Austrian presidency, the FPÖ’s candidate received 48% of the vote. In many ways, the FPÖ is a survivor—it’s one of the longest-living radical populist parties, having existed for decades longer than many of its contemporary sister parties. Still, the context of this election is very different from previous ones, and the Freedom Party itself has changed.

Today, significant factions within the People’s Party openly advocate a coalition with the radical right. The ÖVP is actually in government with the FPÖ in three of Austria’s nine federal states. Indeed, their agendas in key areas such as the economy, the environment, immigration, and the protection of traditional Austrian culture are similar. The main difference is that the ÖVP remains committed to the rule of law and the current constitutional framework, while the FPÖ hints at wanting to ”to bring down the system”, force the government to submit to referendums to stay in office and, if necessary, place what the party considers the will of the people above constitutional limits.

The FPÖ’s recent election platform reads like a blueprint for the establishment of an illiberal democracy.

Another contextual difference from the past is that the FPÖ seems to have found a model to admire and emulate: Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and his illiberal form of government.2 The FPÖ’s recent election platform reads like a blueprint for the establishment of an illiberal democracy. Critical media, non-compliant courts, and politically divergent teachers are to be reined in through a variety of measures ranging from financial pressure and disciplinary action to emergency legislation. Ad hoc plebiscites would be used to invalidate election results and terminate governments that run afoul of popular sentiment, while minority protections and basic rights would be subject to political whim. For example, naturalized citizens are threatened with losing their Austrian citizenship and being deported if they do not “integrate sufficiently.” Equal protection and minority rights would become the subject of a tug-of-war between the government and national and supranational liberal institutions, which the Freedom Party would instrumentalize to promote national cohesion.

Of course, the FPÖ does not have the parliamentary majority necessary to make such sweeping changes. A two-thirds majority is required to amend the Austrian constitution, and more fundamental changes would require a national referendum. There are also limits to what the People’s Party will tolerate. It has influential centrist factions, of the Christian and liberal variety, that are often critical of the party’s gradual shift to the right. The Austrian business community, which plays an important role in the ÖVP as well, is also generally reluctant to attract negative international attention. In addition, Austrian institutions are strong, especially the courts, and above all the Constitutional Court. It has shown itself to be independent and has a liberal track record in its recent history, despite the fact that many of its members have been appointed by conservative-dominated governments.

While Austrian Conservatives have been criticized both domestically and internationally for bringing the radical right into government and validating their positions, the reality is more complex. The fact is that Austria has had right-wing majorities in elections since the mid-1980s but was governed by a center-left coalition led by the Social Democrats for much of that time. Although the ÖVP could have formed coalitions with the radical right every time, it has rarely chosen to do so, and even the most recent government with the left-leaning Greens confirms this trend, although the ÖVP could have continued its coalition with the FPÖ. It is also clear that the conservatives are under much stronger pressure from radical right-wing forces and find it more difficult to keep their distance, especially in rural areas, where the boundaries between the voters of the two parties are generally blurred.

Personalities and Power Struggles

What is likely to happen now? It is ironic that the Freedom Party’s clear victory now makes its participation in government less likely than if it had come in second. Chancellor Nehammer and the ÖVP have ruled out forming a government with Kickl as a cabinet member and are even less willing to be junior partners in a coalition led by Kickl. If the FPÖ had done less well, Kickl could easily have resigned and the party would have been satisfied with the junior role. With these results, however, it seems unlikely that the FPÖ’s clear winner, who increased his party’s vote share by 13%, would give way to an ÖVP leader who lost more than 11% of his. There are also clear personal animosities, and Nehammer has repeatedly emphasized that Kickl is a conspiracy theorist who is dangerous for democracy and cannot be trusted. For his part, Kickl has not forgiven some people in the ÖVP for ending the coalition in 2019 and explicitly insisting that Kickl, then interior minister, resign after disturbing rumors emerged that he had interfered in investigations against far-right groups.

A coalition with the SPÖ, while numerically possible, would only have a one or two-seat majority and thus be precarious. Moreover, it would be called a coalition of losers. Adding the NEOS party would increase the parliamentary majority and include an election winner, but a coalition of three parties with such different agendas is extremely fragile, especially if it has to tackle politically difficult reforms. A coalition against the Freedom Party would likely be used by the latter to mobilize in the regional elections, where the FPÖ would then be, de facto, the only significant opposition and thus benefit from voters’ frustration with the government, even if they are not FPÖ loyalists.

A coalition against the Freedom Party would likely be used by the latter to mobilize in the regional elections, where the FPÖ would benefit from voters’ frustration with the government.

In general, the formation of a coalition in any direction would become easier if certain personalities stepped aside. Without Kickl in a prominent role, a right-wing coalition is likely. This could also happen if right-wing groups in the ÖVP push Nehammer aside. The most likely political leader to be forced out is the Social Democrat Babler, whose left-wing populist rhetoric and personal attacks on Nehammer are seen as an obstacle even by people in the SPÖ, who fear that he could botch a coalition offer by the Conservatives. Potential governments also need the approval of Austria’s constitutionally powerful federal president, who has made no secret of his opposition to Kickl and the FPÖ.

Kickl’s campaign succeeded in convincing a significant number of voters that elites are culpable, that the lives of ordinary Austrians are threatened in many ways, and that political leaders seem to have lost all perspective…

In short, Austria faces politically uncertain times. What can be said, and what is borne out in the exit polls, is that Kickl’s campaign succeeded in convincing a significant number of voters that elites are culpable, that the lives of ordinary Austrians are threatened in many ways, and that political leaders seem to have lost all perspective and are more concerned with esoteric issues than with providing a sense of security and community—a “fortress of freedom,” which was the FPÖ’s central campaign promise.


Reinhard Heinisch is Professor of Comparative Austrian Politics at the University of Salzburg (2009-). His main research is centered on comparative populism, Euroscepticism, political parties, the radical right and democracy. His research has appeared in journals such as the Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Political Research, Party Politics, West European Politics, Democratization, among others. His latest book is Politicizing Islam in Austria (Rutgers University Press 2024). He continues to be an associate of the European Studies Center of the University of Pittsburgh and has been a regular visiting scholar with Renmin University of China in Beijing.

  1. Unpublished OGM Exit Poll 09/29/2024, proprietary data of the author. ↩︎
  2. In fact, the first media channel to interview the FPÖ’s Kickl after the election was the extreme-right AUF1, which has launched a new donation campaign (see 58:35 in the video linked above) using a bank account tied to the Hungarian megabank MBH, which has close ties to Orbán and has previously been shown to fund other radical-right parties in Europe, e.g., lending the Spanish party Vox €9.2 million during the last election. ↩︎

Image made by John Chrobak using “Babler.Portrait (52798868564),” by Team Basis licensed under CC Attribution 2.0 Generic; “EPP Congress Bucharest – Day 2 3C1A3820 (53573234583),” by European People’s Party licensed under CC Attribution 2.0 Generic; “Wahlparty Nationalratswahl 2024 (54030569220),” by Die Grünen licensed under CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication; “Parlament in Wien – Demokratie-Kampagne 2024 04,” by WWWeb.pix licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International; “Bregenz-Landhaus-OeVP-Bus-Vorarlberg geht vor-01ASD,” by Asurnipal licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International; “Parlament in Wien – Demokratie-Kampagne 2024 06,” by WWWeb.pix licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International; “Herbert Kickl – Pressekonferenz am 13. März 2020,” by C.Stadler/Bwag licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International.